Consumer targeting in residential demand response programmes by Holyhead, James C et al.
Consumer Targeting in Residential Demand Response
Programmes
James C. Holyhead
Agents, Interaction and
Complexity Group
Electronics and Computer
Science
University of Southampton, UK
jch2g12@ecs.soton.ac.uk
Sarvapali D. Ramchurn
Agents, Interaction and
Complexity Group
Electronics and Computer
Science
University of Southampton, UK
sdr@ecs.soton.ac.uk
Alex Rogers
Agents, Interaction and
Complexity Group
Electronics and Computer
Science
University of Southampton, UK
acr@ecs.soton.ac.uk
ABSTRACT
Demand response refers to a family of techniques that are
available to electricity suppliers to aid with balancing supply
and demand, typically by calling on consumers of electric-
ity to reduce consumption during periods of high demand.
In this paper we propose a novel approach to residential
demand response, in which incentives are targeted at the
subset of consumers who are both relevant (likely to use
shiftable appliances, such as washing machines and dish-
washers during peak hours) and willing to reduce (likely to
react positively to a reduction request from their electricity
supplier). To this end, we present a mixed integer program-
ming solution that finds the optimal subset of consumers
to target with incentives. We show that our solution is ca-
pable of significantly reducing supplier costs and smoothing
peaks in electricity demand by targeting only a subset of the
consumer pool.
1. INTRODUCTION
Aging electricity distribution networks, increasing demand
and ambitious CO2 reduction targets have caused many de-
veloped countries to consider how to best upgrade their elec-
trical networks to meet the demands of the 21st century [12].
The ‘smart grid’, a network that facilitates a two way flow
of both electricity and information, is an emerging solution
to this problem of next generation electricity distribution
[13]. The introduction of smart grid technologies such as the
smart meter have made it possible for the suppliers of elec-
tricity to communicate with consumers in real-time. These
messages may be in the form of pricing signals, which are
used to incentivise consumers to alter their electricity con-
sumption as part of so-called ‘demand response’. Demand
Response is a family of approaches that call upon electricity
consumers to curtail or to reschedule their electricity us-
age in response to requests from their electricity supplier
[14] or from the grid operator. These consumers are typi-
cally offered incentives for compliance with these requests or
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penalties for failing to comply [2]. These requests are often
issued at times of particularly high demand or as a response
to shortfalls in generation caused by equipment failures on
the grid. Customer responses to these requests alter the
shape of the aggregate demand profile, often by reducing or
smoothing peaks in demand.
Existing demand response approaches targeted at residential
consumers have been focussed on tariff based methods [11,
6]. These schemes make use of differential pricing, where
the cost per unit of electricity varies periodically through-
out the day in an attempt to nudge consumers into altering
their consumption behaviour. For example, during periods
of high load, the price of electricity will be increased to dis-
suade consumers from activating non-essential appliances.
One subcategory of differential pricing is ‘real-time pricing’
(RTP). In an RTP scheme, the price of electricity is varied on
an hourly or half hourly frequency with the prices being an-
nounced on a day ahead or hour ahead basis [2]. Economists
typically consider RTP to be the most efficient differential
price mechanism for use in demand response programs [1].
However, we argue that such schemes place a high informa-
tion burden on consumers, which leads to poor consumer re-
tention rates. In 2005, Rocky Mountain Power in Utah, USA
evaluated the use of their differential pricing based tariffs.
They found that in opt-out schemes, up to 98% of partic-
ipating consumers chose to leave the programme after the
mandatory period had been completed [9]. This indicates
that the participants of differential pricing schemes do not
feel that the inconvenience of resheduling their appliance us-
age is sufficiently compensated for by the cost savings they
earn as participants.
The impact of this additional information burden can be
seen in the prevalence of ‘demand response fatigue’ in res-
idential demand response trials [8]. This fatigue results in
a progressive disengagement from the scheme over time –
as the novelty of a new tariff wears off, consumers begin to
ignore the price signals and their consumption behaviour re-
verts to the behaviour expressed under static pricing, which
often leads to a net increase in the costs incurred by the con-
sumer when compared to static pricing. If a scheme cannot
retain its participants, then it is not sustainable.
Several solutions have been proposed to the problem of resi-
dential demand response. Xiao et. al [17] model the problem
as a task scheduling problem, but the authors find that their
solution is intractable for non-trivial numbers of consumers.
Ramchurn et.al. [11] aim to find a trade-off between the
cost savings that a consumer can make by rescheduling ap-
pliances against a comfort cost’ assigned to the rescheduling
of appliances. However, they do not capture the full range
of consumer behaviour in their model. In Chandan et. al.
[3] the authors rank consumers according to the flexibility
of their appliance usage in an attempt to target those con-
sumers who would be the least inconvenienced by reduction
requests, but the complexity of their algorithm means the
number of consumers they can consider is limited.
To address these shortcomings, we propose a novel approach
to demand response, where incentives are targeted at those
electricity consumers who are both ‘relevant’ (likely to use
shiftable appliances, such as washing machines and tum-
ble dryers during peak hours) and ‘flexible’ (likely to react
positively to an incentivised reduction request from their
electricity supplier). We will show that the targeting of in-
centives to individual consumers reduces the costs incurred
by the supplier, reduces peaks in demand. These individual
requests may also reduce the information burden on the con-
sumer, which in turn may lead to greater consumer retention
rates.
We focus our attention on the shifting of ‘shiftable static
loads’, such as dishwashers, washing machines and tumble
dryers.1 The shiftable static loads we concern ourselves with
require direct consumer interaction; a dishwasher cannot be
used before the consumer has filled it with dirty dishes and
similarly, a washing machine cannot be used until the con-
sumer has loaded it with dirty laundry. Further, there is
evidence that consumers prefer to schedule the use of these
appliances manually, even when a system is available to au-
tomate the process [5].
Thus, in this paper, we advance the state of the art in the
following ways:
• We present a novel model of customer behaviour that
captures the differences in how consumers respond to
reduction requests, both in terms of their willingness
to shift consumption, but also how the consumer will
shift consumption (pre-emption or deferral).
• We propose a novel mixed integer programming solu-
tion to select the optimal subset of consumers that
should be targeted with demand reduction requests
and for which time period those reduction requests
should be issued.
• We evaluate our solution using a dataset of real-world
consumption data and show that our targeting algo-
rithm and consumer response model lead to greater re-
ductions in peak demand and lower supplier costs when
compared to current models of consumer behaviour.
We also show that our solution only requires partici-
pation by a portion of the consumer pool, reducing the
1We omit any discussion of thermal loads or electric vehicle
charging, as the scheduling of these loads may be automated
by an intelligent agent without impacting on user comfort.
impact of ‘demand response fatigue’, which could lead
to improved retention rates.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2
we discuss related work in the field of residential demand
response. Section 3 presents a formalisation of the demand
response problem. Section 4 describes our novel consumer
response model and our approach to finding the optimal
subset of consumers to target with demand reduction re-
quests. Section 5 provides an empirical evaluation of our
model and our consumer targeting approach and Section 6
provides concluding remarks and a discussion of future work.
2. BACKGROUND
The problem of rescheduling appliance operation in order to
effect peak reduction has been well studied. In this section
we outline some of the different solutions that have been
proposed to the problem of residential demand response.
Xiao et. al. [17] addressed the optimisation problem as a
task scheduling problem where each load request is given an
earliest start time and a deadline for completion. Their so-
lution seeks to find the optimal mapping of appliance usage
requests to timeslots in order to minimise the cost within
an individual timeslot. The authors note that this task
scheduling formulation is NP-hard and therefore intractable
for large numbers of demand requests. By constrast, we
show that the solution proposed in this paper is capable of
scaling to communities of tens of thousands of consumers.
This in turn contrasts with Ramchurn et. al. [11], who pro-
pose a solution using a linear programming formulation to
the deferrable load scheduling problem and include an ex-
plicit measure of consumer comfort. A scaling factor is used
to denote a consumer’s preference for comfort or cost sav-
ing. This measure of consumer comfort acknowledges that
asking a consumer to reschedule their appliance usage car-
ries some non-financial penalty in terms of convenience, but
the authors stops short of defining a probabilistic measure
of a user’s willingness to shift. In addition, they scale this
comfort cost by the size of the shift, acknowledging that
consumers will often prefer to reschedule their consumption
as little as possible, but this does not capture the full range
of potential consumer responses to reduction requests. The
consumer response model we propose in this paper allows
for a much richer representation of consumer behaviour in
demand response settings, which we show leads to greater
reductions in peak reduction performance.
In Chandan et. al. [3], the appliance scheduling optimi-
sation problem is formulated as a mixed integer non linear
program (MINLP). Consumers are given a score that indi-
cates how greatly they would be inconvenienced by a load
shifting request. The consumers are ranked in order of their
flexibility with the highest ranked being used as input for
the MINLP solver, representing the consumers who would
be least inconvenienced. The remaining consumers are dis-
carded to reduce the complexity of the problem. Rather
than ranking consumers in terms of their convenience, the
solution we propose in this paper targets consumers whose
expected behaviour leads to a reduction in the supplier’s ex-
pected costs. Additionally, we do not need to pre-select the
consumers we examine as our solution is capable of solving
problems for tens of thousands of consumers.
Some commercial demand response schemes have tackled the
problem of peak reduction by issuing reduction requests to
their scheme participants for times of high demand [10]. We
will benchmark the performance of our solution against this
approach later in this paper.
None of these approaches take into consideration the full
variety of potential consumer responses to a demand re-
sponse event, whether it be triggered by a differential pric-
ing scheme or other form of incentive. The unique socio-
technical challenges posed by residential demand response
programess are illustrated in the ‘Agent B’ field study [5],
where an intelligent booking system was deployed to help
consumers make efficient use of their washing machines in
the presence of an RTP tariff. The authors discovered that
even when the system offered to automate the booking pro-
cess by finding the optimal operating times, the study partic-
ipants preferred to carry out the scheduling manually, using
the booking system in an advisory capacity only.
In the following section we formalise the problem of residen-
tial demand response.
3. THE DEMAND RESPONSE PROBLEM
Electricity is an unusual commodity in that it is not feasible
to store it in large quantities due to the high cost of storage
devices [4]. This means that electricity much be consumed
at the same time it is generated and the supply must always
match (be in balance with) the demand to prevent system
instability and possible collapse.
The majority of energy is traded through bilateral contracts
between the generators and the suppliers, which are often
made far in advance of the time of consumption. Typically
about half of the total volume of electricity traded within
Great Britain is traded ‘seasons ahead’ [16].
The nature of electricity demand means it is impossible for
a supplier to accurately predict their demand requirements
months or even years ahead of time. Electricity markets en-
able suppliers to adjust the amount of electricity they are
contracted to purchase through energy exchanges, where
the various electricity suppliers can buy and sell electric-
ity from one another. As the day the electricity has been
contracted for approaches, the supplier can fine-tune their
position through these exchanges.
We denote the volume of electricity that a supplier has con-
tracted for as Γ = {Γ1 · · ·ΓT } and the total electricity de-
mand consumed as B = {B1 · · ·BT }.
We define any consumption above Γ to be a deficit, d =
{d1 · · · dT }, where the deficit at time t, dt is defined as fol-
lows:
dt = max(0, Bt − Γt) (1)
Similarly, any consumption below Γ is defined as a surplus,
s = {s1 · · · sT } where the surplus at time t, st is defined as
follows:
st = max(0, Γt −Bt) (2)
Figure 1: An example of a customer response pro-
file. In this example we see the probability of the
consumer ignoring the reduction request (τ = 0) is
approximately 0.35.
A deficit at time t, dt, will incur a cost per kWH of ρ
t
buy
where ρtbuy > 0 ∀t and a surplus at time t, st will be sold
through the balancing market at a cost per kWh of pˆtsell,
where the penalty cost incurred by the supplier, ρsell is the
difference between the price per kWh originally paid by the
supplier for the electricity, ρt and pˆ
t
sell.
The prices set by the balancing mechanism, ρbuy and pˆsell
are set higher and lower than normal market rates respec-
tively. This is to disincentivise suppliers from making use
of the balancing mechanism as anything other than a last
resort.
Given these market conditions, a supplier wishes to initiate
a demand response event that leads to a reduced deficit or
surplus and therefore a lower cost.2 In the next section we
present an optimal solution to this problem that identifies
which consumers to target with demand reduction requests
in order to minimise the expected cost to the supplier.
4. ANOPTIMALMILP SOLUTIONTOTHE
DEMAND RESPONSE PROBLEM
In this section we provide details of our model of consumer
response behaviour and present an optimal solution to the
problem of targeting incentives to consumers.
4.1 Consumer Response Model
For a supplier of electricity, the ideal outcome of a demand
response scheme is a smooth profile (one with no peaks).
Achieving this goal is more complicated than simply incen-
tivising consumers to reduce their electricity consumption
2Although we use supplier cost minimisation as the moti-
vating example in this paper, the same approach can be ap-
plied to any scenario where deviation from baseline Γ leads
to some penalty being incurred. An alternative to a financial
penalty may be increased CO2 emissions.
during periods of high demand because large numbers of
those consumers may activate their deferred appliances im-
mediately after the reduction event has passed. This syn-
chronisation of rescheduled appliances may lead to one or
more secondary peaks that pose the same problems as the
original peak [11]. The tendency for shifted loads to syn-
chronise and form secondary peaks is known as the ‘pay-
back effect’ [7]. A successful peak reduction programme
must therefore account for the potential emergence of these
secondary peaks. In this section we propose a model of con-
sumer behaviour that takes into account how a user resched-
ules her consumption in the event a reduction request is
issued. Rather than modelling a consumer’s willingness to
shift as a single probability value, we model a user’s demand
response behaviour by a probability mass distribution that
describes the probability of when a shifted appliance acti-
vation has been rescheduled for. For example, a washing
machine may be activated 2 hours after a demand response
period (a deferral) or it may be activated 2 hours prior to
the demand response period (a pre-emption). An example
of such a consumer response distribution is shown in Fig-
ure 1. By accounting for the variety in consumer responses,
we are able to simulate aggregate consumer behaviour that
results in a smoother consumption profile.
We represent a user’s demand response behaviour by a prob-
ability mass distribution defined as:
p′t(τ) = P (zt+τ = 1) (3)
where zt+τ ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether the consumer resched-
ules their shiftable appliance usage for the time period t+ τ
given that they received a reduction request from their sup-
plier for time t. We represent the length of the shift by
τ ∈ {−T, ...T}. In the case that τ = 0, the consumer has
chosen not to shift or curtail their consumption and τ < 0 in-
dicates that the consumer has pre-empted their consumption
and τ > 0 indicates a deferral of consumption. A consumer’s
response distribution can be determined by analysing their
behaviour during historical demand response events.3
We will use this probability distribution later when com-
puting the consumer’s updated demand following a demand
reduction request.
This approach differs from current practice by modelling
a consumer’s behaviour in terms of how they shift their
consumption. Existing approaches often assume that con-
sumer’s will always respond to price signals/incentives when
doing so would lower the price of their appliance usage [11]
or only consider whether a consumer’s response in terms of
accept/reject without considering how the rescheduled load
may itself lead to unwanted system level behaviour, such as
a secondary peak [3].
4.2 Optimal Consumer Selection
In what follows, we present an optimal solution to finding
sets of consumer demand reduction recommendations that
reduce the cost of the aggregate demand profile to the sup-
3The detail of the learning algorithm are beyond the scope
of this paper and is left for future work.
plier. This solution takes the form of a mixed integer linear
program.
In a demand response programme, the supplier aims to se-
lect a subset of consumers whose predicted behaviour during
demand response events minimises the cost of the aggregate
demand profile produced by its consumer’s demand require-
ments.
The total cost to the supplier of balancing their demand can
therefore be calculated as follows:
C =
T∑
t=0
st ρ
t
sell + dt ρ
t
buy (4)
Note that only one of the two clauses are non-zero at each
time step because it is not possible for both dt and st to
be greater than zero (the supplier cannot simultaneously be
experiencing a surplus and a deficit), so at least one of the
clauses will be cancelled out at each timestep. The supplier
wishes to initiate a demand response event that results in
an aggregate demand profile that costs less than C.
Given a set of consumers I and a day split into T time
slots, we define B = (B1, B2, · · · , BT ) to represent the base-
line consumption profiles of the consumer’s within the sup-
plier’s customer pool and we define CB to be the cost of
the aggregate consumption profile to the supplier (see equa-
tion 4). We now compute B′, a (T + 1)x|I| matrix where
B′t,i = {B′t,i,1, · · · , B′t,i,T } represents the expected consump-
tion profile for consumer i given that a reduction request for
time period t was issued. B′i,j,t represents the updated con-
sumer demand at time t given that consumer j received a
reduction request for time period i. This expected profile
is generated using the consumer’s response profile p′t (see
equation 3).
The (T+1)th row in the matrix represents the case where no
reduction request is issued to the consumer, i.e., B′T+1,i =
Bi.
We introduce a (T + 1)x|I| matrix of binary decision vari-
ables, K, where Kt,i ∈ {0, 1}. Kt,i = 1, indicates that
consumer i will be issued a demand reduction request for
time t, except for the case where t = T + 1, where a value
of 1 indicates that no reduction request will be issued for
consumer i on the day in question. Our solution finds the
optimal values of K that minimise the cost of the aggregate
consumption profile to the supplier.
We define the updated deficit, d′ = {d′1, · · · , d′T } and the
updated surplus s′ = {s′1, · · · , s′T } as the difference between
the threshold Γ and the sum over all consumers and all time
periods of the products of the decision variables K and the
matrix of updated consumption profiles, B′.
d′t = max(0,
∑
i,j
Ki,jB
′
i,j,t − Γt) (5)
s′t = max(0, Γt −
∑
i,j
Ki,jB
′
i,j,t) (6)
We now find the values of K that minimise the cost to the
supplier, as defined in the following objective function:
K∗ = arg min
K
T∑
t
s′t ρ
t
sell + d
′
tρ
t
buy (7)
subject to the following constraints:
d′t ≥ 0 (constraint 1)
d′t ≥
∑
i,j
Ki,jB
′
i,j,t − Γt (constraint 2)
s′t ≥ 0 (constraint 3)
s′t ≥ Γt −
∑
i,j
Ki,jB
′
i,j,t (constraint 4)
s′t ≤ Γt xt (constraint 5)
s′t ≤ Γt −
∑
i,j
Ki,jB
′
i,j,t +M(1− xt) (constraint 6)∑
t∈T
Ki = 1 (constraint 7)
In order to formulate the problem as a mixed integer linear
program, we must remove the non-linear max functions that
appear in the definitions of d′t and s
′
t (see equations 5 and
6).
The definition for d′t requires the variable to take a value
greater than or equal to 0. Constraint 1 states this explic-
itly. Similarly constraint 2 states that the value of s′t must
take a value greater than or equal to the second argument in
its max function,
∑
i,j Ki,jB
′
i,j,t − Γt. We assume that the
value of ρbuy will always be positive (occasions where suppli-
ers will be paid by the grid operator to use excess generation
are extremely rare), these constraints are sufficient to guar-
antee that the value of d′t will take the greater value of 0
or
∑
i,j Ki,jB
′
i,j,t − Γt. Were it to take a value greater than
this, the objective function could be minimised further by
reducing the value of d′t.
We begin the process for s′t in the same way, with con-
straints 3 and 4 requiring the variable to take values are
both greater than or equal to 0 and greater than or equal
to Γt − ∑i,j Ki,jB′i,j,t. However, since the value of ρsell
may take a negative value (the refund paid by the balanc-
ing mechanism to the supplier for their surplus was greater
than the price the supplier originally paid for the electric-
ity), we need to add further constraints to prevent the value
of s′t from inflating. This would happen whenever ρsell took
a negative value because the objective function would be
minimised when the value of s′t = ∞. To prevent this in-
flation, we must also include constraints 5 and 6. These
constraints introduce a new binary variable x = {x1 · · ·xt},
where xt ∈ {0, 1}. Constraint 5 states that the value of s′t
must be less than or equal to the value of Γtxt where Γt rep-
resents the upper bound on the value of Γt−∑i,j Ki,jB′i,j,t
(when the total updated power demand = 0). Constraint 6
introduces a big-M coefficient (a very large number), where
−M represents the lower bound of Γt−∑i,j Ki,jB′i,j,t (where
the updated power demand = ∞). The effect of these
two constraints means that xt will take the value 0 when
Γt − ∑i,j Ki,jB′i,j,t < 0 and 1 otherwise and the value
of s′t cannot take a value larger than the greater of 0 or
Γt −∑i,j Ki,jB′i,j,t.
Constraint 7 requires that the sum of any row in the ma-
trix K must be equal to 1 (a consumer can only receive a
single reduction request per day or no request). We apply
this constraint to limit the inconvenience caused to any one
consumer.
In order to identify the subset of consumers who, when tar-
geted, result in the lowest expected cost to the supplier,
every combination of consumers must be evaluated. This
means the size of the solution space grows exponentially
in the number of consumers in the pool. However, as we
will show in the next section, the algorithm can find opti-
mal solutions for consumer pools that number in the tens of
thousands.
In the following section we simulate, using real-world data,
a community of residential electricity consumers engaged in
a demand response programme to evaluate the performance
of our solution.
5. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section we provide an empirical evaluation of our con-
sumer selection algorithm. We first introduce the real-world
consumption dataset that we use to evaluate our algorithm,
before describing our experimental setup, including how we
are simulating customer responses. We then provide results
that shows our approach is capable of performing peak re-
duction on real world data and that we can achieve these
reduction involving only a portion of the entire pool. Fi-
nally, we show that the algorithm is capable of scaling to
communities of tens of thousands of consumers.
5.1 HES Dataset
The Household Electricity Use Study4 (HES) was carried
out on behalf of the Department for Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs (DEFRA), the Department of Energy and Cli-
mate Change (DECC) and the Energy Saving Trust between
April 2010 and April 2011. The study monitored the house-
hold appliance usage of 251 residential dwellings in the UK.
26 of these dwellings were monitored over a period of one
year at a resolution of 10 minutes, whilst the remaining 225
dwellings were monitored over a rolling one month period at
a 2 minute resolution. We evaluate our model on the dataset
produced from this study.
5.2 Experimental Setup
In what follows, we will provide details of our experimental
setup, including our pre-processing of the HES dataset, and
our approach to synthesising consumer response profiles.
5.2.1 Processing of consumption data
For all of the experiments detailed in this section, we have
divided each day into 12 two hour time steps. Time periods
4https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/household-
electricity-survey
Figure 2: An example aggregate demand profile.
The shaded areas show the days adjacent to the day
that is undergoing demand response.
of 2 hours reflect a suitable granularity when dealing with
human consumers and have been used for this purpose before
[15].
In order to generate a large amount of unique real-world
data, we have placed a sliding window on each household’s
profile and extracted the profiles for each weekday (includ-
ing the 12 hours immediately before and after each week-
day) as a separate consumer, i.e. for a household h we have
extracted day 2 and day 3 and will consider them as sepa-
rate consumers. By doing this we are able to perform ex-
periments on sets of up to 10,000 unique days, where each
day represents a consumer.5 By splitting up a household’s
data in this way, we risk generating multiple consumers with
similar underlying behaviour. However, since a consumer’s
contribution to a demand response event is a combination
of both the consumer’s consumption and response profile,
consumers exhibiting similar consumption will still provide
varied contributions to the demand response effort.
In order to account for the possibility of a consumer shifting
consumption to an adjacent day, we extract consumption
data in chunks of 48 hours. For this reason many of the
consumption graphs have time axes starting at time step
t = −6, corresponding to noon on day d− 1, and ending at
t = 17, corresponding to noon on the day d + 1. As we are
performing demand response for day d, we are only inter-
ested in reducing peaks in demand that fall in the interval
t = 0 and t = 11, which correspond to the 12 time steps
of day d. Figure 2 shows an example demand profile and
highlights the area corresponding to day d.
5.3 Simulation of Customer Responses
In order to test our model’s reaction to customer responses,
we generate a number of synthetic response profiles. In order
5A disadvantage of this approach is that we are not able to
show how show special events (such as major sporting events
or days with cold temperatures) impact on the aggregate
demand profile, but this is a minor concern.
Figure 3: The performance of the ‘Response Aware’
reduction strategy. Forward market threshold, Γ is
denoted by the dashed grey line. Performance was
averaged over 20 runs and the error bars represent
the 95% confidence interval.
to generate the pre-emption probabilities, we select a value
representing the most likely shift for the consumer by sam-
pling from a normal distribution mean= −1, σ = 1. This
biases this maximum probability to shifts near the reduction
request timestep, to represent the tendency of consumers to
shift their consumption immediately before or immediately
after a demand response event [11]. In Figure 1, this maxi-
mum pre-emption probability is shown at τ = −2. The re-
maining pre-emption probabilities trail away from this value.
A similar approach is taken to calculating the deferral prob-
abilities, with the most likely shift being found by sampling
from a normal distribution with mean= 1, σ = 1.
There is currently insufficient data relating to consumer’s
responses to propose a detailed data-driven model. How-
ever, despite its simplicity, this model remains consistent
with existing models of consumer convenience and with ob-
servations made during demand response field trials [11, 7].
In order to focus on the impact of our consumer response
model on system performance, in the experiments detailed
in this section, the consumer’s willingness to shift was set to
1 for all consumers (the consumer pool always complies with
reduction requests from the supplier). The results presented
below therefore represent an upper bound on the algorithm’s
performance.
5.4 Simulation of an Electricity Market
We simulate an emergy market with a number of residential
consumers. For the purposes of clarity we set uniform prices
such that ρtbuy = 6 x ρ
t
sell ∀t ∈ T . The value of ρbuy is so
much greater than ρsell because the value of ρ
t
buy represents
the punitive price per kWh imposed by the balancing mech-
anism and ρtsell represents the difference between the refund
per kWh paid by the balancing mechanism and the original
price paid for that electricity by the supplier. A more realis-
tic price scheme may see the prices vary in line with the level
of demand – high demand leading to higher values of ρbuy
and ρsell, however, we wish to show that the peak reduction
performance our algorithm achieves is not dependent on an
externally determined price scheme. Similarly, for clarity,
we define a flat threshold, Γ, where Γt is equal to 90% of
the maximum demand on day d.
5.5 Reduction Strategies
To evaluate the performance of our targeting algorithm, we
consider three reduction strategies:
• Response Aware (‘Aware’): The algorithm utilises the
consumers’ response profiles when computing the op-
timal subset of consumers to target with demand re-
duction requests.
• Response Ignorant (‘Ignorant’): The algorithm does
not take consumers’ response profiles into account when
computing the optimal subset of consumers to target.
The algorithm only takes into account the shiftable
load the consumer has available at the timestep un-
der evaluation. This strategy will demonstrate how
our novel targeting algorithm works with current con-
sumer modelling techniques.
• Peak Period Only (‘Peak Only’): All consumers re-
ceive a demand reduction request for the time period
with the highest load. This represents a classical ap-
proach to the problem of demand response, where a
supplier will issue a blanket request to all participants
in a demand response scheme [10]. No account is taken
of a consumer’s likely response and no consideration is
given to the amount of shiftable load available to a
consumer.
In what follows, we evaluate these three strategies in terms
of peak reduction, supplier cost reduction and in terms of
the percentage of the consumer pool who are recruited by
the scheme.
5.6 Peak Reduction Performance
We measure the impact that our solution has in terms of
peak reduction by considering the maximum power demand
value on the day under reduction before and after reduction.
We calculate a percentage peak reduction as follows:
Pred =
maxt(Bt)
maxt(
∑
i,j Ki,jB
′
i,j,t)
∗ 100 (8)
Figure 3 shows the average performance of the response
aware reduction strategy. It shows that the targeting algo-
rithm consistently manages to reduce the peak in time slot
10. We show a comparison of peak reduction performance
in Figure 4. This shows that the additional information pro-
vided by the consumer response profiles leads to increased
peak reduction when compared to the ‘response ignorant’
and na¨ıve ‘peak period only’ reduction. The increased per-
formance of the ‘response aware’ strategy over the ‘response
ignorant’ strategy is statistically significant at a 95% level of
confidence. The ‘peak period only’ strategy also occasion-
ally leads to negative peak reductions – that is, the peak
Figure 4: Peak reduction performance of the target-
ing algorithm for three different reduction strate-
gies.
in demand grew after the demand response event. Figure
5 shows how the ‘peak period only’ reduction strategy has
successfully reduced the original peak, but it has led to the
creation of a secondary peak in the preceding timestep that
is larger than the original.
Figure 6 shows that in addition to significant peak reduction,
both the ‘response aware’ and ‘response ignorant’ strategies
lead to substantial cost savings for the supplier. The dif-
ference in cost reduction between the ‘response aware’ and
‘response ignorant’ strategies is not statistically significant,
but this result shows that the inclusion of consumer response
behaviour does not negatively impact the potential cost sav-
ings produced by our targeting algorithm and so a supplier
would have no economic reason for choosing to use the sim-
pler reduction strategy.
5.7 Consumer Recruitment
One of the benefits of the approach we outline in this work,
is that incentives will only be targeted to those consumers
whose expected behaviour leads to a reduction in the cost
to the supplier. On average, our ‘response aware’ solution
issues demand reduction requests to 56.4% of the consumer
pool compared to the ‘peak period only’ reduction strategy,
which sends requests to 100% of the consumer pool. The
‘response ignorant’ reduction strategy recruited an average
of 57% of consumers showing that our targeting algorithm
is capable of reducing the recruitment of consumers even
when the consumer behaviour model is omitted. This means
that our targeting algorithm results in fewer interruptions
to the daily lives of the supplier’s consumers, potentially
minimising the onset of ‘demand response fatigue’, as well
as leading to fewer incentives being paid to consumers whose
behaviour following a reduction request actually leads to an
increase in the supplier’s costs.
In Figure 7 we show how our solution distributes recom-
mendations among the different time periods. Where a tra-
ditional approach to demand response, such as that repre-
Figure 5: An example of the ‘payback effect’ gen-
erated by the ‘peak period only‘ reduction strategy
(red profile). The green profile represents the reduc-
tion performance of our ‘response aware’ solution
on the same consumer pool. The forward market
threshold, Γ is denoted by the dashed grey line
sented by the ‘peak only period’ strategy may only issue de-
mand reduction requests to the period experiencing a peak
in demand, our solution only issues slightly more than 50%
of the recommendations to that peak period. This demon-
strates that it is not only the selection of the right subset of
consumers that contributes to the performance of the strat-
egy, but the time periods that those requests specify also
have a role to play.
5.8 Scalability
Finally, Figure 8 shows how the running time for the al-
gorithm varies with an increasing number of consumers.6
These results show that although the size of the solution
space increases exponentially with the number of consumers,
solutions for large scale problems can still be found in reason-
able time. We utilise IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Stu-
dio (CPLEX), which is an industry standard software pack-
age for mathematical optimisation, to solve the consumer
targeting problem. The CPLEX pre-solver makes use of the
branch and cut algorithm to identify opportunities to reduce
the size of the problem. The branch and cut method utilises
the branch and bound algorithm to solve a continuous relax-
ation of the linear program and makes use of cutting planes
(additional linear constraints) to progressively tighten those
relaxations. The addition of these ‘cuts’ normally reduces
the number of branches requires to solve a MIP, enabling
solutions to be found for larger scale problems.
The scalability of our algorithm means that it could poten-
tially be used to coordinate all of a supplier’s consumers
across a localised area such as a town/city, enabling the
supplier and the grid operator to more efficiently manage
demand across that area.
6The experiments were executed on an Intel Core i7-2600
workstation with 3.40GHz cores and 16GB of RAM.
Figure 6: Cost reduction performance of the target-
ing algorithm for three different reduction strate-
gies.
6. DISCUSSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this work we presented a rich model of customer be-
haviour that describes how consumers will respond to re-
duction requests. We also proposed a mixed integer pro-
gramming solution to select the optimal subset of consumers
that should be targeted with demand reduction requests.
We evaluated this solution using electricity usage data from
residential dwellings within the United Kingdom. We have
shown that our solution is capable of performing significant
peak reductions whilst reducing supplier incurred costs. We
demonstrated that our consumer response model leads to
improved peak reduction without compromising on the costs
incurred by the supplier when compared to a consumer be-
haviour model that ignored consumer responses. We also
evaluated our algorithm against a classical approach that
saw all consumers within the consumer pool being targeted
with a reduction request for the time period with the max-
imum demand usage and showed that our solution showed
greater peak reduction and increased cost savings for the
supplier. Finally, we have shown it to be capable of coordi-
nating the electricty usage of tens of thousands of consumers
with only a few minutes of computing time.
In future work we will propose a method to learn a con-
sumer’s response profile using the system’s previous interac-
tions with the consumer and evaluate how the performance
of our algorithm changes when the consumer response profile
containts uncertainty. We will also introduce uncertainty to
the input, by utilising predictions of appliance usage, such
as those provided by [15].
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